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Abstract
Voting district boundaries are often manipulated, or gerrymandered, by politicians in order to
give one group of voters an unfair advantage over another during elections. To make sure a
system of voting districts is not gerrymandered, the population size, the shape, and the voting
efficiency of each party in each district should be taken into consideration. Following recent
work of Boris Alexeev and Dustin G. Mixon, we discuss mathematical criteria for each of these
three aspects, and we prove how problems arise when attempting to apply all three at once to a
districting system–first to a simplified districting system and then to a more realistic districting
system.
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1
Background Information
1.1 Introduction
Gerrymandering is a way of dividing a geographic area into voting districts, that is, into a
districting system, in a way that unfairly favors one political group. Policymakers are usually
the people given the task of redrawing district boundaries and they often do so in a way that
gives more voting power to their party or takes away voting power from minority groups. To
learn more about gerrymandering, see [6].
One strategy used is called packing. When packing is used, many voters from one group are
packed into only a small amount of districts so that they cannot affect the outcome of any other
districts and will win only the ones they are packed into. One tell-tale sign of packing is when
district boundaries are irregularly shaped, so that they include all voters from the same group
even when they live in very different areas.
The opposite strategy, cracking, occurs when the voters from one group are divided up, putting
a small amount of them in each district. This ensures that they don’t have enough people in any
district to win it. To determine if cracking is being used, we can calculate the Efficiency Gap,
which was created by Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee in [5].
Mathematicians are working to come up with a standard to be used to determine if a districting
system is fair or gerrymandered. This is difficult and they are encountering many problems in
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the process. It is controversial which factors can determine district fairness and which cannot.
There have been many court cases on the issue.
Gerrymandering is a difficult mathematical problem because it involves looking at both geom-
etry of districts and the arrangement and amount of voters for each party. In real life cases, one
must take into consideration natural barriers that are often irregularly shaped, such as coasts,
mountains, and rivers, and human barriers such as infrastructure, city boundaries, and personal
property lines. These provide geometrical challenges for creating districts. Additionally, residents
of any place do not live in orderly rows, but rather scattered throughout, densely packed in cities
and sparsely sprinkled throughout rural farmland, which create challenges for providing fairly
represented districts. To complicate the matter further, oftentimes those who belong to the same
political party or racial minority live close to each other in one area, rather than spread evenly
throughout the land, making it more difficult to provide them with fair representation.
This project will work from [1], and takes ideas from previous work done by Moon Duchin
and Mira Bernstein in [2]. In the paper [1], Alexeev and Mixon, provide a theorem and proof
that there is a trade-off between regularly shaped, or compactness, of districts and partisan
efficiency, or the amount of votes per party which work towards a victory. I rewrite their paper
in a different way which will provide more details and be more clear to the reader than the
original one. I will provide examples and other proofs which build off of their ideas.
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2.1 Three Criteria for Fair Districts
There are “three well established desiderata” used to flag districts as potentially gerrymandered.
I will explain each, both formally and informally, and provide examples for clarity.
2.1.1 One Person, One Vote
This criterion ensures that each district has approximately the same population size. It is very
difficult to create districts with exactly the same population, so instead, we create an interval
window that the population has to fall between. This is the least controversial, and possibly
most important criterion because it makes sure that each voter has the same voting power. For
example, the outcome of a district of one voter would be entirely in the hands of that one voter.
In a district consisting of one million voters, each one would only have one millionth of a say in
the outcome of the election.
Definition 2.1.1. Let T be the population of voters in the state. Let k be the number of
districts in the state. Let Ti be the population of voters in district i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The
state satisfies Criterion (i), One Person One Vote if there exists δ ∈ [0, 1) such that
(1− δ)
⌊
T
k
⌋
≤ Ti ≤ (1 + δ)
⌈
T
k
⌉
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 4
Having a smaller δ would mean that the populations of the districts must be closer together.
Having a larger δ means there is more leeway.
Example 2.1.2. Let T = 25 and k = 4. First, suppose δ = 0.1. Then (1 − δ) ⌊Tk ⌋ = (1 −
0.1)
⌊
24
4
⌋
= 0.9 · 6 = 4.8 and (1 + δ) ⌈Tk ⌉ = (1 + 0.1) ⌈254 ⌉ = 1.1 · 7 = 7.7 Therefore, 4.8 ≤ Ti ≤ 7.7
for all i ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and hence the population of the four districts must each be between 5 and
7. ♦
2.1.2 Polsby-Popper Compactness
When districts are drawn with the intent of including or excluding a certain demographic, the
boundary often looks strange, long and curving to dodge certain areas and include other non-
contiguous ones. In this case, the districts are often not compact, meaning they have a large
perimeter and a small area. Daniel D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper invented the Polsby-Popper
score in [3], which measures the ratio of area to perimeter of a district to determine compactness.
A higher ratio indicates that districts are more compact and a smaller ratio indicates that
districts are less compact and more likely to be gerrymandered.
Definition 2.1.3. Let k be the number of districts in the state. Let {D1, . . . , Dk} be the
districts in the state. Let Ri be the area of district i and let Pi be the perimeter of district i for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The state satisfies Criterion (ii), Polsby-Popper Compactness if there
exists γ ∈ (0,∞) such that
4piRi
P 2i
≥ γ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 4
It is very difficult to calculate the perimeter of a shape whose boundary is made of irregular
curves. For this reason, we include here the Grid Polsby-Popper Ratio which also measures
compactness, but for districts with more easy to measure perimeters.
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Definition 2.1.4. In a simplified district, one in which district boundaries are formed with
rectilinear lines, we can determine compactness of a district by using the Grid Polsby-Popper
Ratio. Let {D1, . . . , Dk} be the districts in the state. Let Ri be the area of district i and let Pi
be the perimeter of district i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The Grid Polsby-Popper Ratio is 16Ri
P 2i
.
A state satisfies the Grid Polsby-Popper Compactness if there exists γ ∈ (0,∞) such that
16Ri
P 2i
≥ γ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 4
Example 2.1.5. Here we will calculate the Grid Polsby-Popper ratio of each district in Fig-
ure 2.1.1. In Figure 2.1.1, we have X represent one voter for Party X , and O represents one
voter for Party O. The bold lines represent the boundaries of the 6 districts. Going clockwise
starting in the top left corner, number the districts 1 through 5 and number the district in the
center 6.
Districts 1,2, 4 and 5 each have a perimeter of 12 and have a Grid Polsby-Popper Ratio of
16Ri
P 2i
= 16·7
122
= 0.78. Districts 3 and 6 have a perimeter of 14, and are less compact, with a Grid
Polsby-Popper Ratio of 16Ri
P 2i
= 16·7
142
= 0.57. ♦
Figure 2.1.1.
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2.1.3 Partisan Efficiency
Partisan efficiency measures how efficiently the votes of either party are used. For example, if
one party wins a district by a landslide, this is not an efficient use of its votes considering that it
only needed slightly more than half the votes to win. After receiving more than half the votes,
any remaining voters would have been more useful if they lived in other districts which lost by a
small amount of votes. A party is inefficient when the majority of voters belonging to one group
are packed into a few districts. Also, if one party loses many districts by only a small amount,
then each of the votes that went towards these districts are wasted. They would have been used
more efficiently if they were moved to a district that they had a chance of winning and had let
their district lose by a large amount.
If a state has a close number of voters for its two different parties, but still has one party win
the election by a large amount of districts, then there is reason to suspect that the efficiency gap
is large and gerrymandering is occurring. That is why the criterion states that if the difference
between total number of votes for a party is less than a certain amount, then we must ensure
that the efficiency gap is small. When an efficiency gap of a state is small, there is less of a
chance that it is gerrymandered.
Definition 2.1.6. Let T be the population of voters in the state. Let k be the number of
districts in the state. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let Ti be the population of voters in district i, and
let Ai and Bi be the number of voters in district i for Party A and Party B, respectively. Let A
and B be the number of voters in the state for Party A and Party B, respectively.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if Party A wins district i, the wasted votes in that district are defined
as
WA,i = Ai −
⌈
Ti
2
⌉
and WB,i = Bi;
similarly if Party B wins the district. The Efficiency Gap is defined as
EG =
1
T
k∑
i=1
(WA,i −WB,i),
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The state satisfies Criterion (iii), Partisan Efficiency if there exist α, β ∈ (0,∞) such
that if |A−B| < βT , then |EG| < 12 − α. 4
Example 2.1.7. Here we will calculate the Efficiency Gap of the state in Figure 2.1.1. Going
clockwise starting in the top left corner, number the districts 1 through 5 and number the
district in the center 6. The wasted votes for Party O and Party X in each district are as
follows: WO,1 = 3, WX,1 = 0, WO,2 = 1, WX,2 = 2, WO,3 = 0, WX,3 = 3, WO,4 = 3, WX,4 = 0,
WO,5 = 3, WX,5 = 0, WO,6 = 0, WX,6 = 3. The efficiency gap for the entire state is
EG =
1
42
((3− 0) + (1− 2) + (0− 3) + (3− 0) + (3− 0) + (0− 3)) = 2
42
.
Let β = 0.4. Then |O−X| = |26− 16| = 10 < 16.8 = 0.4 · 42 = β · T . First, let α = 0.3. Then
|EG| = 242 = 0.048 < 0.2 = 12 − 0.3 = 12 − α, and Criterion (iii), Partisan Efficiency is satisfied.
Next, let α = 0.48. Then |EG| = 242 = 0.048 ≮ 0.02 = 12 − 0.48 = 12 − α, and Criterion (iii),
Partisan Efficiency is not satisfied. ♦
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3
Gerrymandering in a Simplified County Districting
System
3.1 A County Districting System
Realistically, voters live all over the place and it is really difficult to group them together in an
orderly way. This makes the task of creating fair voting districts very complicated. But first if we
suppose that voters do live in an orderly simplified way, we are able to work with the simplified
districts and draw conclusions that will help us when we next look at more realistic districts. To
simplify the state, here we assume that each voter lives in a county. In Theorem 3.2.2, we assume
each county has an equal population size. In reality, this would be very difficult to achieve, but
here it gives us a place to start.
Definition 3.1.1. A County Districting System is a subdivision of the state into smaller
shapes, called Counties, of population of at least 2, such that each voting district is a union of
these shapes. 4
Figure 3.1.1 shows an example of a state divided into districts using a County Districting
System.
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Figure 3.1.1.
3.2 Implication of Criterion (i)
Here, we look at Criterion (i), which ensures that all the districts are around the same size. We
show that when voters are organized into counties, it is much easier to ensure that each district
is the same size, and therefore, that each voter has the same amount of voting power.
First, we show a lemma that is needed in the proof and then we show the proof.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let T, k ∈ N. Suppose T, k ≥ 2. Then ⌈Tk ⌉+ ⌊Tk ⌋ ≤ T .
Proof. For the first case, suppose T = kr for some r ∈ N. Then ⌈Tk ⌉+⌊Tk ⌋ = ⌈krk ⌉+⌊krk ⌋ = 2r ≤
kr = T . For the second case, suppose that T = kr+n for some r ∈ N and some n ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}.
Then
⌈
T
k
⌉
+
⌊
T
k
⌋
=
⌈
kr+n
k
⌉
+
⌊
kr+n
k
⌋
=
⌈
r + nk
⌉
+
⌊
r + nk
⌋
= 2r + 1 ≤ kr + n = T .
Theorem 3.2.2. Suppose there is population T who lives in a state which is divided into at least
2 districts using the county districting system. Suppose each county has the same population size.
Let δ ∈ [0, 1). If Criterion (i) holds and δ < 1T , then all districts have the same population.
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Proof. Suppose Criterion (i) holds and suppose δ < 1T . Let k be the number of districts and let
k ≥ 2. Let {T1, . . . , Tk} be the populations of the districts. Let Li be the number of counties in
district i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let S be the population per county and let S ≥ 2. By Criterion
(i), we know
(1− δ)
⌊
T
k
⌋
≤ Ti ≤ (1 + δ)
⌈
T
k
⌉
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Let i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Without loss of generality, suppose Ti ≥ Tj . Then
Ti ≤ (1 + δ)
⌈
T
k
⌉
and Tj ≥ (1 − δ)
⌊
T
k
⌋
. Therefore, Ti − Tj ≤ (1 + δ)
⌈
T
k
⌉ − (1 − δ) ⌊Tk ⌋ =⌈
T
k
⌉− ⌊Tk ⌋+ δ(⌈Tk ⌉+ ⌊Tk ⌋). Note that ⌈Tk ⌉− ⌊Tk ⌋ ∈ {0, 1}.
By Lemma 3.2.1, we know δ(
⌈
T
k
⌉
+
⌊
T
k
⌋
) < 1T · T = 1. Therefore Ti − Tj < 2.
Note Ti = LiS and Tj = LjS. Then S(Li − Lj) = Ti − Tj < 2. Then 0 ≤ Li − Lj < 2S ≤ 1.
Since Li and Lj are whole numbers, it must be the case that Li − Lj = 0. Then Ti = Tj .
3.3 An Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering a County Districting
System
The paper [1] by Boris Alexeev and Dustin G. Mixon proposed the idea that the three criteria
for a fair districting system that we defined in Chapter 2 cannot all be used at once because
there is some arrangement of voters that would never be able to satisfy all three, it is impossible.
Here, we take our simplified districting system, our county districting system, and show that
the efficiency gap cannot be used on it because no matter how the districts are drawn, there will
always be some arrangement of voters such that the efficiency gap is too large to be considered
fair.
First, we provide a lemma that will be needed for the proof.
Lemma 3.3.1. Let α, β ∈ (0,∞). There exists an a, b ∈ N such that
1. a > b,
2. a+ b is even,
3. a−ba+b < min{12 , α, β}.
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Proof. By Archimedes, there exists n ∈ N such that 1n < min{12 , α, β}. Let a = n+2 and b = n.
Then
a− b
a+ b
=
(n+ 2)− n
(n+ 2) + n
=
2
2n+ 2
=
1
n+ 1
<
1
n
< min{1
2
, α, β}.
Observe that a+ b = 2(n+ 1) which is even. Clearly, a > b.
Theorem 3.3.2. Let α, β ∈ (0,∞). For any county districting system, there are populations
A and B such that for every choice of districts, Criterion (iii) is violated. That is, there is no
county districting system that guarantees a small efficiency gap.
Proof. Suppose the state consists of n counties. Let a and b be as in Lemma 3.3.1. In each
county, there are a voters for Party A and b voters for Party B.
Suppose there are k districts in the county districting system. Let Li be the number of counties
in district i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Notice there are n counties in the state and that ∑ki=1 Li = n.
Let Ai and Bi be the number of voters for Party A and Party B in district i, respectively, for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Notice that aLi = Ai and bLi = Bi. Let Ti be the population of district i, so
that Ai +Bi = Ti. Let A and B be the number of voters in the whole state who vote for Party
A and Party B, respectively. Notice that A = an and B = bn. Let T be the total population of
voters, and notice that A+B = T .
Since a > b, then aLi > bLi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and therefore, Party A wins every district.
Using the formula for Efficiency Gap, stated in Criterion (iii), we see for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
that WA,i = aLi −
⌈
(a+b)Li
2
⌉
and WB,i = bLi. Since we let a + b be even, we can remove the
ceiling brackets, so WA,i = aLi − (a+b)Li2 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
The Efficiency Gap is
EG =
1
n · (a+ b)
k∑
i=1
aLi − (a+ b)Li
2
− bLi = 1
n · (a+ b)
k∑
i=1
Li(a− a+ b
2
− b)
Since we know that
∑k
i=1 Li = n, this can be simplified to
EG =
n
n · (a+ b)(a−
a+ b
2
− b) = a− b
a+ b
− 1
2
.
Since from Lemma 3.3.1 we know that a−ba+b <
1
2 , then |EG| = |a−ba+b − 12 | = 12 − a−ba+b .
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From Lemma 3.3.1, we know that α > a−ba+b . Therefore, it is true that
1
2 − a−ba+b > 12 − α, and
hence |EG| ≮ 12 − α.
But, from Lemma 3.3.1, we know that a−ba+b < β. Hence
an− bn
an+ bn
< β,
and so
an− bn < β(an+ bn),
and substitution tells us that A−B < βT . Since A > B, we see that |A−B| < βT .
Hence, |A− B| < βT holds, but |EG| < 12 − α does not hold. Hence, for any grid districting
system, there are populations A and B such that every choice of districts violates Criterion
(iii).
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4
Gerrymandering in a Realistic Districting System
4.1 A Realistic Districting System
Now we will look at a districting system in which voters can live anywhere in the state and are
not confined to counties or any other way of organizing them. The boundaries of the districts
can be curvy, squiggly, straight, or drawn in any other way without restrictions.
Definition 4.1.1. Suppose the state is a square. A Districting System is a subdivision of the
state into areas called Districts.
Figure 4.1.1 shows an example of a state divided into districts using a Districting System.
4.2 An Impossibility Theorem for Gerrymandering
The paper [1] proves the same theorem that we prove here, that using the three criteria for
fair districts that we listed in Chapter 2 would not work because no matter how the district
boundaries are drawn, there is some arrangement of the population such that one of the criteria
would be violated. We chose to rewrite their proof because it left out many details that we found
necessary in order to accept the theorem as true and in order for the reader to be able to follow
the proof.
The following lemmas address details that were skipped in the original proof.
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Figure 4.1.1.
Lemma 4.2.1. Let δ ∈ [0, 1). Let α ∈ (0, 12). Let β, γ ∈ (0,∞). Let k ∈ N be such that k ≥ 2.
Let F =
√
1−δ
2k . There exist a, b, l, n ∈ N such that
1. ba <
Fn2−4piγ−1F√2n−8pi2γ−1
F 2n2+4piγ−1F
√
2n+8pi2γ−1
2. b < a
3. a−ba+b < β
4. a−2ba+b ≤ α− 12
5. a+ b = l2
6. l is even.
Proof. By Archimedes, there exists m1 ∈ N such that 1m1 < β.
Because α ∈ (0, 12), we know that α − 12 ∈ (−12 , 0). Observe limc→∞ −c+22c+2 = −12 . Therefore,
there is some m2 ∈ N such that if p ∈ N and p ≥ m2, then −p+22p+2 < α− 12 .
Next, let q = max{m1,m2}. Let m = 2q2 − 1. Note that m ≥ m1 and m ≥ m2.
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Let a = m+ 2 and b = m.
Then b < a and ba < 1 and Part (2) is satisfied. Then
a−b
a+b =
1
m+1 <
1
m ≤ 1m1 < β, hence
Part (3) is satisfied.
Next, because m ≥ m2 we know that a−2ba+b = m+2−2mm+2+m = 2−m2m+2 = −m+22m+2 < α − 12 . Therefore,
Part (4) is true.
Let l = 2q. Then l is even, so Part (6) is true. Then a+ b = 2m+ 2 = (2q)2 = l2. Therefore,
Part (5) is true.
Next, we simplify the fraction in Part (1). Let y = 4piγ−1F
√
2, and let z = 8pi2γ−1. Let r ∈ N.
Then
Fr2 − 4piγ−1F√2r − 8pi2γ−1
F 2r2 + 4piγ−1F
√
2n+ 8pi2γ−1
=
F − yr − zr2
F + yr +
z
r2
.
Observe
lim
r→∞
F − yr − zr2
F + yr +
z
r2
= 1.
Recall ba < 1. Therefore, there is some n ∈ N such that if p ∈ N and p ≥ n, then ba <
F− y
p
− z
p2
F+ y
p
+ z
p2
.
In particular, we have ba <
F− y
n
− z
n2
F+ y
n
+ z
n2
. Hence
b
a
<
Fn2 − 4piγ−1F√2n− 8pi2γ−1
F 2n2 + 4piγ−1F
√
2n+ 8pi2γ−1
.
Therefore, Part (1) is true.
In the following lemma, and again later on, we will be referring to a square lattice in the
plane, as seen in figure 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2.2. Suppose q points are arranged as vertices of a square lattice of unit u. Let P be
the perimeter of a region containing the points. Then P ≥ u√q.
Proof. The most compact way for points to be arranged on a square lattice is in a square.
The two furthest points from each other on a square are on corners diagonal from each other.
The distance between these two points can be found using the Pythagorean Theorem, where
the sides of the square are the sides of a right triangle and the distance between the two corner
points is the hypotenuse of the right triangle. The length of the side of the square is (
√
q− 1)u.
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Figure 4.2.1.
Therefore, the distance between the two corner points is
√
2((
√
q − 1)u)2 = √2(√q − 1)u. The
perimeter is at least twice the distance between the two corner points, so the perimeter is at
least 2
√
2(
√
q − 1)u. Since q = a + b and because a > b and b ≥ 1, it must be that a ≥ 2,
and therefore q ≥ 3. Then √q ≥ √3, and it follows that (2√2 − 1)√q ≥ (2√2 − 1)√3. Since
2
√
2−1 ≈ 3.166 and 2√2 ≈ 2.828, it is follows that (2√2−1)√q ≥ 2√2. Adding √q to each side
gives us 2
√
2
√
q ≥ 2√2 +√q, and subtracting 2√2 from each side gives us 2√2(√q − 1) ≥ √q.
Therefore, 2
√
2(
√
q − 1)u ≥ √qu and so P ≥ √qu.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let δ ∈ [0, 1). Let k ∈ N and suppose k ≥ 2. Let F =
√
1−δ
2k . Let P be the
perimeter of a district and let R be the area of the district. Suppose P ≥ F . Let  ∈ (0,∞), and
let E =
√
2P
 + 2pi. Let γ ∈ (0,∞). Suppose that Criterion (ii) holds for this district, that is, that
γ ≤ 4piR
P 2
.
1.
F 2 − 4piγ−1F√2− 8pi2γ−12
F 2 + 4piγ−1F
√
2+ 8pi2γ−12
≤ P
2 − 4piγ−12E
P 21 + 4piγ
−12E
.
2.
P 2 − 4piγ−12E
P 2 + 4piγ−12E
≤ R− 
2E
R+ 2E
.
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Proof. (1). Because P ≥ F , it is true that F√2P (P − F ) ≥ 0 and 2pi(F 2 − P 2) ≤ 0, since
F , P , and  are all positive. Then 2pi(F 2 − P 2) ≤ F√2P (P − F ), and by multiplication,
that F 22pi − 2piP 2 ≤ F√2P 2 − F 2√2P . Rearranging the terms gives us F 2√2P + F 22pi ≤
F
√
2P 2+2piP 2, which is equivalent to F 2(
√
2P
 +2pi) ≤ (F
√
2+2pi)P 2. Substituting in E and
multiplying both sides by 4piγ−1 gives us F 24piγ−12E ≤ (4piγ−1F√2+8pi2γ−12)P 2. Next let
A = F 2, B = 4piγ−1F
√
2, C = 8pi2γ−12, x = P 2, and y = 4piγ−12E and substitute these in,
to get Ay ≤ (B+C)x. By rearranging this, it is equivalent to Ay−Bx−Cx ≤ −Ay+Bx+Cx,
and furthermore, to Ax+ Ay − Bx− By − Cx− Cy ≤ Ax− Ay + Bx− By + Cx− Cy. From
factoring, this inequality is equivalent to (A − B − C)(x + y) ≤ (A + B + C)(x − y), which is
then equivalent to A−B−CA+B+C ≤ x−yx+y . By substituting the original values back in, we know that
F 2−4piγ−1F√2−8pi2γ−12
F 2+4piγ−1F
√
2+8pi2γ−12
≤ P 2−4piγ−12E
P 21+4piγ
−12E .
(2). Since Criterion (2) holds, we know γ ≤ 4piR
P 2
, which, by multiplying each side by 2E
and by rearranging, is equivalent to P 22E ≤ 4piγ−12ER. Now, let x = P 2, let v = R, let
y = 4piγ−12E, and let z = 2E, and substitute in these values. Hence, xz ≤ yv. By multiplying
each side by 2, adding xv and −yz to each side, and rearranging terms, we see that xv + xz −
yv − yz ≤ xv + yv − zx − zy. We can factor, to see that (x − y)(v + z) ≤ (v − z)(x + y), and
furthermore, that x−yx+y ≤ v−zv+z . Now we can substitute back in the original values to see that
P 2−4piγ−12E
P 2+4piγ−12E ≤ R−
2E
R+2E
.
Lemma 4.2.4. Let T, n ∈ N. Suppose k ≥ 2 and T ≥ 2k. Then ⌊Tk ⌋ ≥ T2k .
Proof. First, suppose that T = kr for some r ∈ N. Because r > 0, it is true that r > r2 . We
know that r =
⌊
kr
k
⌋
=
⌊
T
k
⌋
. We also know that r2 =
kr
2k =
T
2k . Hence,
⌊
T
k
⌋ ≥ T2k . Next, suppose
that T = kr + n for some r ∈ N and some n ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Since nk < 1 and r2 > 1, we
know that nk <
r
2 and therefore
r
2 +
n
k < r. Because
n
k > 0, we know
n
2k <
n
k , and it follows that
r
2 +
n
2k < r. Since
⌊
T
k
⌋
=
⌊
kr+n
k
⌋
=
⌊
r + nk
⌋
= r and T2k =
kr+n
2k =
kr
2k +
n
2k =
r
2 +
n
2k < r, it is the
case that
⌊
T
k
⌋ ≥ T2k .
20 4. GERRYMANDERING IN A REALISTIC DISTRICTING SYSTEM
Theorem 4.2.5. Let δ ∈ [0, 1) and let α, β, γ ∈ (0,∞). For every possible arrangement of at
least 2 districts in a square, there exists an arrangement of Party A voters and Party B voters
that violates one of Criteria (i), (ii), and (iii).
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose our square is 1× 1. We assume Criteria (i) and (ii)
are true and show that Criterion (iii) does not hold. Let n, a, b, and l be as in Lemma 4.2.1.
Let  = 1n . Begin by dividing a 1 × 1 square into a grid of n2 smaller squares with edge length
, as shown in Figure 4.2.2.
Figure 4.2.2.
Further divide each ×  square into a grid with l2 smaller squares of edge length 1nl , as shown
in Figure 4.2.3.
Suppose Party A has a voters in each ×  square and suppose Party B has b voters in each
× square. Since Lemma 4.2.1 states that a+b = l2, it would be possible to distribute the voters
so that each 1ln × 1ln square contains one voter in its center, either from Party A or Party B. Let
us suppose that the voters are distributed in that way. Let T be the total population of voters
in the state. It follows that n2(a+ b) = n2l2 = T .
Let k ∈ N and let k ≥ 2. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Next, partition the 1× 1 square into k districts,
denoted D1, . . . , Dk, in a way so that Criteria (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The boundary of Di is denoted ∂Di, and the length of the boundary, which
is the perimeter of Di, is denoted Pi. We find the tube of Di, denoted Ui, by taking ∂Di and
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Figure 4.2.3.
thickening it by 
√
2 on either side. We see that ∂Di is contained in a union of ×  squares in a
rectilinear shape. As shown in Figure 4.2.4, we see that Ui contains this union of ×  squares.
It can be shown that Ui has area of at most
√
2δi + 2pi
2; we omit the details. The area of
one  ×  square is 2, so the tube has at most
√
2δDi+2pi
2
2
=
√
2δDi
 + 2pi  ×  squares. Let Ei
be the greatest possible number of ×  squares in Ui. Then Ei =
√
2δDi
 + 2pi.
Now we will determine the fewest and greatest amount of votes for Party A and Party B in
Di. First, suppose all of the voters for Party B that belong to the union of  ×  squares that
∂Di intersects with lie inside of district i. Then Di contains the greatest amount of votes for
Party B, which is the amount of ×  squares contained in Di plus the amount of ×  squares
contained in Ui times the amount of votes for Party B per  ×  square. Let Ri be the area of
Di. Then the amount of ×  squares in Di is Ri2 and the greatest amount of votes for Party B
is b(Ri
2
+ Ei).
Next, suppose the voters for Party A that live in the ×  squares that intersect with ∂Di all
lie outside of Di. Then Di contains the fewest possible votes for Party A, which is the amount
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Figure 4.2.4.
of  ×  squares contained in Di minus the amount of  ×  squares contained in Ui times the
amount of votes for Party A per ×  square, which is a(Ri
2
− Ei).
Recall from Definition 2.1.1 that Ti is the total population for Di and (1 − δ)
⌊
T
k
⌋ ≤ Ti ≤
(1+δ)
⌈
T
k
⌉
. Since T, k ∈ N, and k ≥ 2 and T ≥ 2k, from Criterion (i) and Lemma 4.2.4 it follows
that
Ti ≥ (1− δ)
⌊
T
k
⌋
≥ (1− δ) T
2k
= (1− δ)n
2l2
2k
.
Since Lemma 4.2.2 tells us that the smallest possible perimeter around q points arranged on
a square lattice of unit u is u
√
q, we know that we can take the number of points arranged on
a square lattice, multiply it by the unit length of the lattice squared and then take the square
root of that to find the smallest possible perimeter around around the points. Since Di contains
(1− δ)n2l22k points arranged on a square lattice of unit 1nl , it follows that Pi ≥
√
1−δ
2k .
Now, recall from Lemma 4.2.1 that ab ≤ F
2−4piγ−1F√2−8pi2γ−12
F 2+4piγ−1F
√
2+8pi2γ−12
. Since Criteria (i) and (ii) are
satisfied, since Pi ≥
√
1−δ
2k , since k ≥ 2 and since  ∈ (0,∞), by Lemma 4.2.3 we know that
a
b ≤ F
2−4piγ−1F√2−8pi2γ−12
F 2+4piγ−1F
√
2+8pi2γ−12
≤ P 2i −4piγ−12E
P 21+4piγ
−12E ≤ Ri−
2E
Ri+2E
. Therefore ab ≤ Ri−
2E
Ri+2E
. By multiplying
the top and bottom of the fraction on the right side of the inequality by 1
2
and rearranging,
we see that a(Ri
2
− E) ≥ b(Ri
2
+ E). Let Ai be the amount of votes for Party A in Di and let
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Bi be the amount of votes for Party B in Di. Since a(Ri2 − Ei) is the fewest possible votes for
Party A in Di and b(Ri2 + Ei) is the greatest amount of votes for Party B in Di, it follows that
Ai ≥ a(Ri2 − Ei) ≥ b(Ri2 + Ei) ≥ Bi, and so for each District i, Party A wins the vote.
Since Party B loses every district, according to Definition 2.1.6, all of its votes are wasted. It
has bn2 votes, since there are n2 ×  squares in the state and b votes per ×  square. Party A
wastes an2− ⌈T2 ⌉ votes. Since b < a, then n22b2 < n2(a+b)2 < ⌈n2(a+b)2 ⌉ = ⌈T2 ⌉, that is, bn2 < ⌈T2 ⌉.
Then an2 − ⌈T2 ⌉ < an2 − bn2 and Party A wastes fewer than an2 − bn2 votes.
Then, by Definition 2.1.6 and Lemma 4.2.1,
EG <
an2 − 2bn2
n2(a+ b)
=
a− 2b
a+ b
≤ α− 1
2
< 0.
Hence,
|EG| > |a− 2b
a+ b
| ≥ 1
2
− α.
By Lemma 4.2.1, we know a > b and we know a−ba+b < β. Hence, |A − B| = |an2 − bn2| =
n2(a − b) < βn2(a + b) = βT . For Criterion (iii) to be satisfied, it must be the case that if
|A−B| < βT , then |EG| < 12 − α. But we see that this criterion does not hold.
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5
Ideas for Further Study
5.1 Other Definitions of Compactness
The impossibility theorem for gerrymandering showed that using the three well-known criteria
for fair districting together does not work. Where can we look from here to keep searching
for solutions? The criteria given in Chapter 2 are not the only ways to measure compactness,
efficiency and individual voting power. For example, there are other well known methods for
calculating compactness of a district. One of these methods uses the Roeck Compactness Ratio,
from [4], where the area of the district is compared to the smallest possible circle it can fit
inside. If we wanted to use the Roeck Compactness ratio as a criterion in place of Polsby-Popper,
Criterion (ii) might look something like this:
Definition 5.1.1. Let k be the number of districts in the state. Let {D1, . . . , Dk} be the districts
in the state. Let Ri be the area of district i and let Ci be the area of the smallest possible circle
that can contain district i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The state satisfies Criterion (ii), Roeck
Compactness if there exists γ ∈ (0,∞) such that
Ri
Ci
> γ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 4
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In this case, the number γ would be between 0 and 1, where if γ = 1, the district would be as
compact as possible and if γ were very small, the district would not be compact. This also is true
if we used Polsby-Popper Compactness. Therefore, the impossibility theorem for gerrymandering
may still hold if we replaced Polsby-Popper Compactness with Roeck Compactness.
There are even more methods for determining compactness besides these two. And there may
be other methods of determining voter efficiency that are yet to be discovered.
Perhaps there will never be a standard for fair districting systems that can apply to all districts
and each one’s fairness will have to be determined individually.
Perhaps, allowing a party who wins 51% of the votes to take the entire district is just not fair
and voting districts should be done away with.
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